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Competition policy and free trade
Antitrust provisions in PTAs

anu bradford and tim b üthe

A. Introduction
Trade agreements increasingly contain provisions concerning ‘behindthe-border’ barriers to trade, often beyond current World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments (Dür, Baccini and Elsig 2014). Today’s
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) may include, for instance, rules
regarding ‘technical’ barriers to trade that go beyond the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), accelerating the
replacement of differing national product safety standards with common
international standards and thus reducing the trade-inhibiting effect of
regulatory measures (Büthe and Mattli 2011; World Trade Organization
2012). Today’s PTAs may also go beyond WTO rules in prohibiting preferences for domestic producers in government procurement (Arrowsmith
and Anderson 2011; Dawar and Evenett 2011), although here the effectiveness of the PTA provisions is in question (Rickard, Chapter 11 in
this volume). PTA provisions concerning trade in services (Trebilcock
and Howse 2005: 349ff.), restrictions on the use of trade remedies and
anti-dumping (Bown 2011; Bown and Wu 2014) and provisions concerning the treatment of foreign investment (Büthe and Milner 2014;
For comments, we are grateful to Todd Allee, Andreas Dür, Manfred Elsig, Simon Evenett,
Bernard Hoekman, Helen Milner and participants of the September 2013 conference ‘Trade
Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements’ at the
World Trade Institute, Bern. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the US
National Science Foundation, Law and Social Science Program, collaborative research grants
SES-1228453 and SES-1228483, supplemented by grants from Columbia Law School, Duke
University Arts & Sciences Council’s Committee on Faculty Research, and the University of
Chicago Law School. For excellent research assistance, we thank Taimoor Aziz, Alexander
Bergersen, Justin Epner, Yian Huan, Dushyant Manocha, Shahryar Minhas, Mark Sater,
Philippe Thill and especially Cindy Cheng and Margarita Kelrikh.
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2006) have similarly attracted substantial attention, as they often go beyond the rules
in the multilateral trade regime. All of these measures involve governments committing to adopt – or to refrain from – particular policies.
The stated objective of such commitments usually is to eliminate or at
least reduce the trade-distorting effects of domestic policies (Bhagwati
and Hudec 1996), though linking particular policy choices to trade might
also serve other purposes. Linkage may, for instance, increase the bargaining space for ‘getting to yes’ on trade liberalisation (see Axelrod and
Keohane 1986; Davis 2004) or reduce the bargaining space, arguably
with the intent of retaining a higher level of protectionism (e.g. SalazarXirinachs 2000). PTA commitments on behind-the-border measures may
also be adopted to ‘lock in’ policies by making it politically and economically more costly for the current government or its successors to depart
from the policy choices specified in the trade agreement (Büthe and Milner 2008; Mansfield and Milner 2012; Moe 2005).
Competition policy – the enforcement of laws against various forms
of anticompetitive behaviour, including cartels and the abuse of market power, as well as the regulation of mergers, acquisitions and joint
ventures – has similarly been the focus of articles and even entire chapters
of numerous international trade agreements.1 Yet, these competition policy provisions in PTAs have only in recent years attracted the attention of
scholars and practitioners, mostly after competition policy was removed
from the negotiating agenda of the WTO Doha Round in 2004 (Anderson and Holmes 2002; Baldwin, Evenett and Low 2009: 94). Only since
Solano and Sennekamp’s (2006) study of the competition chapters of 86
PTAs for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and Anderson and Evenett’s (2006) critique have competition
policy provisions been included among the behind-the-border issues regularly considered in analyses of the international trade regime (Baccini
et al. 2011: 25–8; Teh 2009; World Trade Organization 2011: 142–5).
Competition policy is one of the most powerful policy instruments governments have to shape the structure and operation of market economies.
Competition provisions in PTAs, however, present a puzzle because the
literature on the political economy of trade has, since Smith and Ricardo,
traditionally emphasised that trade openness inherently increases competition by lowering barriers to entry into previously closed markets (see,
1

We will use ‘competition policy’ throughout this chapter for what in the United States is
generally known as ‘antitrust’ law and policy.
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e.g., the Smith and Ricardo selections in Crane and Hovenkamp 2013:
5–40). Indeed, trade economists who advocate liberal foreign economic
policies still regularly argue that one of the inherent benefits of free trade is
that it drives out anticompetitive practices (Blackhurst 1991; Irwin 2009).
The institutionalisation of more liberal trade policies in trade agreements
should thus reduce the need for competition policy. What then is actually
covered by these competition policy provisions in PTAs? And why do we
find them in PTAs at all?
This chapter provides a first, preliminary answer to these questions,
based on a major new and ongoing research project directed by the
authors. We start with a review of the small existing literature on competition provisions in PTAs. We then examine how competition policy
is covered in PTAs and how that coverage has changed over time based
on detailed coding of a random sample of 182 PTAs from the Design of
Trade Agreements (DESTA) Database.2 We then turn to some possible
explanations for the far more frequent inclusion of competition policy
provisions in PTAs over the past two decades. Here, we first contemplate
the possibility that the inclusion of competition provisions is simply part
of a more general tendency to sign ‘deeper’ (more comprehensive) trade
agreements (Dür and Elsig, Chapter 1 in this volume) but find this line of
reasoning raises at least as many questions as it answers. We then consider
the hypothesis that such provisions are attempts to forestall a strategic use of domestic competition policy for protectionist purposes. This
would appear warranted if governments were above all concerned about
discriminatory enforcement of competition law, as one prominent school
of thought suggests. We challenge this account by offering an alternative rationale for the inclusion of competition provisions in PTAs, which
suggests that such provisions reflect a genuine desire by governments –
or at least by competition regulators – to safeguard market competition
when the boundaries of markets no longer coincide with the borders of the
polity. Our analysis of the specific competition policy provisions included
in our sample of PTAs shows that provisions to promote transgovernmental regulatory cooperation and more generally effective competition law
enforcement (consistent with our theoretical approach) are substantially
more common than provisions aimed at constraining competition regulators (as should be expected by the conventional wisdom).
2

This sample is substantially larger (and more clearly a probability sample) than the
samples used in previous work. For more information about the DESTA data, see
www.designoftradeagreements.org.
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B. Prior studies of competition provisions in PTAs
Although the increase in competition policy provisions in PTAs had previously been noted,3 Solano and Sennekamp’s (2006) study for the OECD
was, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to systematically take
stock of competition provisions in a large sample of PTAs.4 Solano and
Sennekamp examine 86 PTAs, a sample that appears to have consisted
of all PTAs that were notified to the WTO Secretariat between January
2001 and July 2005 and that contained a competition chapter. In addition, this sample includes an unspecified number of earlier PTAs as well
as some unnotified agreements, chosen because of their ‘importance to
trade’ (again conditional on having a competition policy chapter) or
because of the special ‘relevance of their competition provisions’ (Solano
and Sennekamp 2006: 6).5
Solano and Sennekamp record information about 24 aspects of each
of those 86 PTAs. Most prominently, they record the type of competition
issue or anticompetitive behaviour addressed (using five very broad categories); whether and to what extent the competition chapter included
provisions for coordination and cooperation between national competition regulators; whether the PTA contains provisions on issues often seen
as linked to competition policy, such as anti-dumping; and whether the
PTA’s dispute settlement mechanism (if any) is applicable to its competition policy provisions. Developing the first explicit coding scheme for
PTA competition chapters was an important contribution, but the resulting data lack precision and detail. Solano and Sennekamp’s coding, for
instance, makes no distinction between a PTA that permanently exempts
substantial portions of the economy from its competition provisions and
a PTA whose competition provisions apply to the entire economy but
only after a transition period (both are simply coded as ‘flexible’ commitments). It also does not allow us to differentiate between horizontal anticompetitive agreements (e.g. price-fixing agreements among competitors) and vertical anticompetitive agreements (e.g. agreements between a
3
4

5

See, for example, Brusick, Alvarez and Cernat (2005) and Silva (2004).
In addition, the question of whether the GATT/WTO needed an antitrust agreement had
been extensively debated; see Bradford (2007), Clarke and Evenett (2003), Fox (1997),
Guzman (2004), Marsden (2003) and Stephan (2004). See also the document collection
of the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy at
www.wto.org/english/tratop e/comp e/wgtcp docs e.htm.
A substantial (though unspecified) portion of their sample thus appears to have been
selected through nonprobabilistic methods, including selection on the dependent variable.
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firm and its distributors to deny competitors market access). Beyond their
coding and its limitations, Solano and Sennekamp come to the overarching qualitative assessment that competition policy provisions in PTAs
are generally intended to support trade liberalisation, as evidenced by an
often explicit recognition that ‘anti-competitive practices can undermine
the trade objective’ or an express objective ‘to combat anti-competitive
behavior [in order to] enhance the trade objectives of the agreement’
(Solano and Sennekamp 2006: 9).
Anderson and Evenett (2006) build on Solano and Sennekamp’s analysis, above all, to examine whether PTAs and competition policy provisions
in PTAs affect the behaviour of the private sector, especially private-sector
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Anderson and Evenett 2006: esp.
29ff.).6 Importantly, they also criticise Solano and Sennekamp’s methodology, in particular, the exclusive focus on competition chapters. As
Anderson and Evenett point out, sector-specific PTA chapters concerning
industries such as financial services, telecommunications or transportation may contain competition policy provisions distinct from, and going
beyond, the provisions in a PTA’s competition policy chapter. In fact, a
PTA may contain such substantial, albeit industry-specific competition
provisions even if it does not have a chapter devoted to competition policy
(Anderson and Evenett 2006: 21f.).
Anderson and Evenett’s warning, based primarily on a close reading of a
few PTAs, that important competition-related PTA provisions appear frequently outside a designated competition policy chapter, is confirmed by
Teh’s systematic analysis of ‘all competition-related provisions’ of 74 PTAs
(Teh 2009: 418). Selected for geographical diversity, economic importance
(presumably of the signatories to overall world trade) and representativeness over time (Teh 2009: 420f.), this sample of PTAs is intended to be
better suited to generalisation than the Solano and Sennekamp sample is,
although it remains somewhat unclear how the author implemented the
6

Their analysis covers cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for 116 countries
over 15 years (1989–2004). Controlling for the size of the M&A-receiving economy and
standard economic covariates, they find that PTAs as such have no statistically significant
effect (except when US and EU participation in the PTA is instrumented, in which case PTAs
actually reduce inward M&A investment), whereas having a national competition policy
law that includes merger regulation significantly reduces cross-border M&As (possibly
because it simply reduces M&As in general). At the same time, PTA provisions that commit
the parties to transparency in their application of competition policy significantly increase
cross-border M&As, whereas other characteristics of PTA competition policy chapters
(including whether the PTA competition chapter includes provisions regarding mergers)
have no significant effect (Anderson and Evenett 2006: esp. 39ff.).
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selection criteria. Based on a very detailed coding of sectoral provisions
for the telecommunications, financial and maritime transport services
industries, as well as general substantive provisions for the treatment of
investments, government procurement and intellectual property rights,
Teh shows that competition-related rules can indeed be found in many
different places in PTAs.
Finally, Sokol (2008) complements this research with an analysis of the
36 PTAs noted in the Organization of American States’ trade database
as having been signed between 1992 and 2006 and to which ‘at least one
Latin American country [was] a party’ (Sokol 2008: 253). Focusing on
this smaller Latin American sample enabled him to code each PTA in
considerable depth and to examine its context, allowing for greater internal validity albeit at the recognised cost of reduced generalisability.7 His
key finding is that all 24 Latin American PTAs that include a competition policy chapter8 exclude those chapters from their dispute settlement
mechanism. He then discusses numerous possible reasons for the apparent
hesitation to subject competition policy to external dispute settlement –
an important issue (see also Teh 2009: 481f.), but beyond the scope of this
chapter.
In sum, existing scholarship on competition policy provisions in PTAs
yields a number of important findings, which are, however, more suggestive than conclusive as a result of small or nonprobability samples of PTAs
and insufficiently fine-grained coding. Our current research, from which
we here report initial, preliminary results, is the first attempt to code the
comprehensive set of PTAs identified by the DESTA project at the level
of detail needed to overcome these limitations of previous research and
provide an accurate picture of competition policy provisions in PTAs.

C. Competition provisions in a sample of 182 PTAs
To overcome the problems that arise from the use of nonprobability
samples of PTAs in most of the research reviewed earlier, we follow
7

8

He finds, for instance, that the prior adoption of a competition law at the national level
has been virtually a prerequisite for Latin American countries to be willing to include a
competition chapter (found in 24 of the 36 PTAs) – a finding that does not hold true in
other regions. Only the three plurilateral PTAs involving the group of ‘Central American
States’ (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) with the Dominican
Republic (1998), Chile (2002) and Panama (2002) contain a competition chapter without
prior adoption of a national competition law by all signatories.
Notwithstanding Anderson and Evenett’s critique of the earlier work, Sokol (2008: 253)
excludes from consideration ‘provisions in other chapters that have competition impact’.
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Koremenos’s (2005, 2007) random sampling approach to the analysis of
international treaties. Specifically, we used a random number generator
to select a random sample of 182 PTAs from the maximally comprehensive list of post–World War II PTAs compiled by Baccini, Dür, Elsig and
Milewicz (see Dür, Baccini and Elsig 2014).9
The following process was used to generate the data reported here. Each
PTA in our sample was independently coded by at least two students at
the University of Chicago or Columbia Law Schools under the guidance
and supervision of the authors.10 For each PTA, coders recorded basic
information, such as the parties to the treaty and when the agreement
was signed. Coders then undertook a thorough content analysis of the
treaty text, including preambles, annexes, appendices and linked implementation agreements, if any. Specifically, coders were asked to answer
numerous questions about each PTA, through which they generated more
than 100 variables per PTA, assisted by survey software that ensured coders
would be asked only the questions that were pertinent, given their prior
answers and known contextual information. The coders thus recorded
a wealth of information about each PTA’s competition chapter (if any),
competition articles (if any) and other competition-related provisions
(discussed later), including the specific kinds of competition policy issues
covered by the PTA (unilateral anticompetitive behaviour, anticompetitive behaviour by two or more firms, mergers, government subsidies
(‘state aid’). The goals of competition policy as well as any permissible
exemptions from the PTA’s competition policy rules were also coded, as
well as the nature and scope of commitments for cooperation among
competition enforcement agencies. Coders further recorded information
about related aspects of each PTA, such as whether the PTA includes
a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), whether the DSM applies to
the competition provisions and whether the PTA includes provisions
9

10

At the time of the sample selection, the collection contained the texts of 395 PTAs. It now
contains 587, and our ultimate goal is to code all of them. The initial sample consisted of
200 PTAs, of which, however, 2 were not in fact double-coded as a result of coder error;
16 were omitted as a result of lack of an English-language text. Translations or foreign
language coding and supplemental coding work to complete the sample of 200 are under
way.
Most of the coders had prior academic training in antitrust law, international trade law or
both; many of the LLM student coders had practised antitrust law prior to embarking on an
LLM. All of the coders received extensive training, including the test coding of multiple
full-length PTAs. Moreover, all coding was conducted using plain-text online surveys
(with quantification automated using the Qualtrics survey software) – a methodological
innovation for content analysis described in greater detail elsewhere.
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concerning intellectual property rights, anti-dumping, government procurement or nontariff barriers (NTBs). Upon completion of the coding,
we conducted an analysis of intercoder reliability and closely re-reviewed,
with a team of coders, every aspect of every PTA where the original coders
had differed to arrive at a final consensus data set.11

I. The form of competition policy provisions across 182 PTAs
To what extent is competition policy covered across the 182 PTAs in
our sample? We take Anderson and Evenett’s critique of Solano and
Sennekamp’s work into account and therefore allow for the possibility
of competition policy provisions occurring in any part of the PTAs we
code. To do so, we asked, first: ‘Does the PTA have a separate chapter
devoted to competition law/policy?’ To qualify, a chapter (or cohesive
group of articles) did not have to have the word ‘competition’ in the title
but had to be substantively about competition law or policy, possibly in
conjunction with closely related issues (such as in a chapter on ‘Business
Practices’). For 50 of the PTAs in our sample, the answer was yes (27.5
per cent of our sample). If the PTA did not contain such a chapter, coders
were asked: ‘Does the PTA have a separate article or articles devoted to
competition law/policy?’ Here, too, we counted any article specifically
devoted to business practices that restrain competition, as well as articles
using the language of ‘antitrust’ or referring to merger review, control
or regulation.12 The answer was yes for 78 of the PTAs in our sample
(42.9 per cent). Across the full sample of the 182 PTAs, we thus find at
least one article, and often several articles or an entire chapter, devoted to
competition policy in 128 PTAs (just over 70 per cent of our sample), as
shown in Figure 10.1.
Anderson, Evenett and Teh advocate an even more inclusive approach.
We allow for such inclusiveness but caution that Teh’s analysis in fact
shows that ‘competition-related’ provisions vary tremendously in how
closely they are related to what might legitimately be considered competition law or policy. Article 39(1)b of the 1997 EC–Jordan PTA, for instance,
states that: ‘The Parties affirm their commitment to a freely competitive
environment as being an essential feature of the dry and liquid bulk
11

12

Such meticulous review of discrepancies is extremely time consuming. We are therefore
only able to draw on fully reliable final data for a subset of the variables so far, making
the empirical analysis consciously preliminary.
Articles solely concerned with government subsidies or other forms of ‘state aid’ did not
count.
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13.7%
Chapter
27.5%
Article
11.0%

Substantive
competition−related
provision, but
no chapter
nor article

4.9%

Mention of
competition
keywords, but
no substantive
provisions
No mention of
competition
42.9%

Figure 10.1 How competition policy is addressed

trade.’ This part of Article 39 (an article devoted to the ‘Cross-Border
Supply of Services’) is highlighted by Teh as an example of competition
provisions outside competition chapters. And the article certainly may
be interpreted as a commitment, in principle, to take action against anticompetitive practices in the transport industry. It is qualitatively different,
however, from PTAs in which a competition policy chapter includes, for
instance, commitments to adopt or maintain a competition law13 (which
makes the prohibition of anticompetitive conduct enforceable by domestic agencies and courts) or maybe even to have or maintain an independent
competition law enforcement agency.14
13

14

As stipulated, for instance, in Articles 14.3(1) and 14.3(2) of the 2008 Australia–Chile
PTA, according to which: ‘Each Party shall maintain or adopt measures consistent with
its domestic law to proscribe anticompetitive activities and take appropriate action with
respect thereto, recognising that such measures will help realise the objectives of this
Agreement. [ . . . ] Each Party shall ensure that all businesses operating in its territory are
subject to its competition laws.’
As stipulated, for instance, in Article XI.2.5 of the 2002 Canada–Costa Rica PTA, according
to which: ‘Each Party shall establish or maintain an impartial competition authority that
is: (a) authorized to advocate pro-competitive solutions in the design, development and
implementation of government policy and legislation; and (b) independent from political
interference in carrying out enforcement actions and advocacy activities.’
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We therefore ask two questions that allow us to differentiate between
various references to competition and related issues in PTAs that do not
contain designated articles or chapters on competition policy. First, we
ask: ‘Does the PTA contain any mention of competition, any mention of
antitrust or any mention of the regulation of cartels, monopolies or mergers/acquisitions?’ If the answer is yes (as it is for 29 of the PTAs without
competition article or chapter), we then ask: ‘Is antitrust/competition policy recognized anywhere in the PTA as a (trade-related but) distinct issue,
that is, not just competition as a characteristic of trade in the sense that
trade inherently entails foreign goods competing with domestic ones?’ In
our assessment, only PTAs that warrant an affirmative answer to the second question (9 PTAs, accounting for 4.9 per cent of our sample) may be
said to contain a substantive discussion of competition policy even when
they contain neither a chapter nor an article devoted to competition policy. Figure 10.1 summarises this information about the ways competition
policy is addressed in our sample of PTAs.
Anderson and Evenett also note that general ‘national treatment’ or
nondiscrimination clauses, which are found in many PTAs as well as in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 1994 WTO
treaties, may be read as already prohibiting discriminatory enforcement
of competition laws.15 This point is underscored in the section on competition policy in the 2011 World Trade Report, which is devoted to the
relationship between PTAs and the multilateral trade regime (World Trade
Organization 2011). Teh (2009: esp. 464–6) goes further in his interpretation of commitments to the ‘horizontal principles’ of nondiscrimination (rare), procedural fairness (moderately common) and transparency
(widespread) among the general principles or in the general administrative provisions of PTAs. Teh attributes to such commitments an effect
on competition (maybe even intentional) that has a similar thrust to
competition policy provisions so that ‘these general horizontal principles may represent significant competition-related elements of [P]TAs’
(Teh 2009: 464). We reject this interpretation as it risks going too far in
broadening the notion of ‘competition[-related] provisions’ to the point
where the concept of competition policy loses its analytical usefulness.
15

They give Article 2 of the 2002 Chile–EU Interim Agreement as an example (emphasis
added by Anderson and Evenett): ‘Imported products of the territory of the other Party
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to domestic products
in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.’
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Although it is technically correct that general PTA provisions for transparency, procedural fairness and national treatment might be applicable
to the enforcement of domestic competition laws and might even be
read to articulate some of the core principles of competition policy, this
potentially vast reinterpretation of general PTA provisions remains at best
untested. To avoid problems of overinclusion, we therefore focus on the
first three categories identified previously, and in particular on the 128
PTAs with at least one article devoted specifically to competition policy.
In the many analyses where it makes virtually no difference to the results,
we also consider the 9 additional PTAs that contain substantive provisions
concerning competition policy without devoting a distinct article to the
topic (for a total of 137 PTAs).

II. Competition policy provisions in PTAs over time
The distribution of our sample of PTAs over time is highly uneven, reflecting in part the explosive increase in PTA formation over the past 20
years but also an inherent limitation of random sampling from a highly
unevenly distributed population: only 26 of our 182 PTAs were signed
before 1991. We therefore hesitate to draw strong inferences about trends
over time prior to 1991, but regressing the share of a year’s PTAs with
either a competition article or chapter on a simple trend term (using logit)
shows a clearly statistically significant increase over time. In fact, before
1991, both competition articles and chapters were very rare, each found in
just 3 of the 26 PTAs. By contrast, during the period of the most intensive
institutionalisation of free trade during the last two decades, competition
provisions in PTAs have generally become more detailed, warranting in
many cases the inclusion of not just a separate article but even an entire
chapter. Figure 10.2 captures this pattern over time by showing the percentage of newly signed PTAs with at least a distinct article devoted to
competition policy (solid line, left-hand scale), as well as the number of
PTAs signed in a given year.16
16

Given the small number of observations per year, we use a five-year moving average for
Figure 10.2 to focus on the overall pattern rather than year-to-year variability. In order
not to show the effect of a new PTA before it is signed, the moving five-year window
consists of the current year and the immediately preceding four years. We start the time
series displayed in 1958 since it is the first year for which there are continuously at least 2
PTAs in the five-year window (with the exception of 1990, where the moving average is
based on a single PTA (the 1988 Canada–US PTA), which accounts for the spike).
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Figure 10.2 Percentage of PTAs with a competition article or chapter, five-year
moving average

D. Explaining the pattern of competition policy articles
and chapters in PTAs
Before turning to the variation in substantive provisions contained in
the competition policy articles and chapters of PTAs, we take up one of
the issues raised by Dür and Elsig (Chapter 1 in this volume) about the
increasing scope and depth of PTAs in recent decades. Based on previous work with Baccini, Dür and Elsig show that the ‘depth’ of PTAs has
generally increased over time, which may account for much of the increasing formalisation, length and detail of PTA provisions in any particular
issue area without the need to resort to issue area–specific explanations.
To be sure, a general trend is inherently dissatisfying as an ‘explanation’.
Similarly to explanations of institutional change that invoke institutional
isomorphism as an explanation, it raises the questions of where the trend
comes from, what sustains it and why we should expect it to affect a
diverse set of issue areas covered in PTAs. It is also not clear whether PTA
competition provisions, even when we focus simply on their presence or
absence or on their form as captured by Figure 10.2 (chapter vs. article
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Table 10.1 All good things go together? Format of competition provisions as
a function of PTA depth

Baccini et al.
Depth Index
Rasch Depth
Index
Constant

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

0.542∗∗∗
(0.142)

0.889∗∗∗
(0.126)

0.899∗∗∗
(0.125)

Estimation

–0.275
(0.321)
logit

N
Pseudo-R2

180
0.0897

ordered
logit
180
0.1724

ordered
logit
180
0.1633

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

1.27∗∗∗
(0.240)
0.595∗∗∗
(0.185)
logit

1.71∗∗∗
(0.217)

1.70∗∗∗
(0.209)

ordered
logit
180
0.2130

ordered
logit
180
0.1974

180
0.1711

Note: Dependent variable differs for models 1 and 4 vs. 2 and 5 vs. 3 and 6; see text
for details. All estimates in Stata 12.1.
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

vs. no/indirect coverage), are well captured by any single global trend. At
the same time, trends can cause inferential problems even when they are
unexplained, so we briefly explore the issue in this section.
In Table 10.1, we report 3×2 sets of bivariate logistic regressions, conducted as very basic, preliminary tests of the hypothesis, given the absence
of an established econometric model that would provide a proper benchmark. The dependent variable for models 1 and 4 is a dichotomous
variable coded 1 if the PTA contains either an article or a chapter and
coded 0 otherwise. Since that measure ignores the potentially important
difference between chapters and articles, we use a second dependent variable (models 2 and 5). It is an ordinal measure coded 2 for PTAs with a
competition policy chapter; 1 for PTAs with a competition policy article;
0 for all other PTAs. Finally, a third dependent variable (models 3 and 6)
takes into account the PTAs with a substantive discussion of competition
issues yet no article or chapter by assigning a 1 to such PTAs, a 2 to PTAs
with a competition article and a 3 to PTAs with a competition chapter.
The independent variable for the first three models is the basic depth
index of Dür, Baccini and Elsig (2014), which, for the 180 PTAs covered
here, ranges from 0 to 6 with a mean of 2.5 and a standard deviation of
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1.6.17 For the second three models, we consider the Rasch depth measure, which for the 180 PTAs ranges from −1.03 to 2.31 with a mean of
0.443 and a standard deviation of 0.918; all else remains the same.18
The estimated coefficients, which are strongly statistically significant
for either of the measures of depth and all three of the dependent variables,
support the hypothesis that the format of competition provisions might
be a function of the general depth of PTAs, though the finding is tentative
given the caveats noted previously. At the same time the pseudo-R2 –
an imperfect approximation of model fit for logistic models – suggests
that there is much variance left to be explained. Moreover, we observe
tremendous variation in the particular elements of competition policy
that are covered, even just within the subset of PTAs with a competition
chapter. We turn to some of that interesting variation in the next section.

E. Explaining the presence and specific content of competition
provisions in trade agreements
A comprehensive account of the variation in competition provisions is
beyond the scope of this chapter, but we observe much, often striking,
variation among the PTAs with substantive competition policy provisions (the 137 PTAs in the first three pie chart segments in Figure 10.1).
The coverage of the traditional core antitrust concerns illustrates this
well: 69 per cent of these 137 PTAs contain provisions concerning cartels
or similar horizontal anticompetitive agreements or practices (between
ostensibly competing firms in the same market). Sixty-three per cent contain provisions concerning anticompetitive vertical agreements or vertical cooperation (between a firm and its suppliers or its immediate customers/distributors). And yet, a striking 89 per cent contain provisions
against unilateral anticompetitive conduct (monopolisation or abuse of
dominance by a single firm).19 This variation is puzzling, at a minimum
insofar as the prohibition of cartels is usually considered far more widely
17

18

19

Dür et al. excluded accession agreements from their index calculation. Hence, we lose
from our sample of 182 PTAs the CEFTA–Croatia accession treaty and the 2003–4 EU
enlargement treaty, which increased the number of EU members from 15 to 25.
For details about both measures, see Dür, Baccini and Elsig (2014). We thank Andreas
Dür for recalculating the two indices without consideration of competition provisions
(so as to safeguard against rendering the hypothesis true by definition) and for making
the measures available to us.
If the sample is restricted to the PTAs with a competition article or chapter, the percentages
rise to 73 per cent, 66 per cent and 94 per cent, respectively.
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accepted than regulatory intervention against anticompetitive behaviour
by a single firm.
In an attempt to explain this variation, we turn to two general schools of
thought regarding the relationship between trade openness and competition policy. These theoretical approaches provide possible explanations
for the prevalence of competition provisions in PTAs, which traditional
trade economics – positing trade liberalisation and competition policy as
substitutes in their capacity to enhance market competition – would not
expect. Although both theoretical perspectives we discuss see trade and
competition law and enforcement as complements, they yield distinctive
observable implications regarding the content of competition provisions
in PTAs, which makes it worthwhile to derive those hypotheses explicitly.
Deductively, the difference between the two approaches turns in large part
on how governments view the relationship between trade and competition policy and their respective roles in generating and preserving market
competition. We submit that PTAs offer distinctly good and direct insights
into this question.

I. Competition policy as protectionism
The first theoretical perspective sees competition policy as a substitute for
trade restrictions. It assumes that governments want to protect domestic
producers (and that they suspect each other of wanting to do so). It further
assumes that competition law can be selectively enforced to the benefit of
domestic firms and the detriment of their foreign competitors. There are
two variants of this ‘competition-policy-as-protectionism’ perspective.
What may be called the aggregate national welfare variant, with strong
affinities to statist theories of international relations, treats governments
as unitary actors and assumes that each government seeks to maximise the
country’s aggregate (consumer + producer) welfare. Under this assumption, (net) imports create an incentive for excessively stringent competition laws and enforcement (relative to what would maximise global
economic welfare), because such an ‘oversupply’ of competition policy
creates benefits for domestic consumers, whereas the costs are borne disproportionately by foreign producers. By contrast, (net) exports create
an incentive for excessively lax competition law and enforcement because
the gains from tolerated anticompetitive behaviour are disproportionately
enjoyed by domestic producers, whereas the costs are disproportionately
borne by foreign consumers (Guzman 1998, 2004; Horn and Levinsohn
2001; Iacobucci 1997; Richardson 1999; Williams and Rodriguez 1995).
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Such selective enforcement is particularly attractive for economically
large countries, that is, countries whose markets are sufficiently large
that enforcement-induced changes in their production or consumption
affect the world price and hence the country’s terms of trade. Strategic
enforcement is attractive for them because it can yield a gain in aggregate
welfare rather than just redistribution among domestic consumers and
producers.
The domestic political economy variant of the competition-policyas-protectionism perspective, with strong affinities to the public choice
perspective on regulation, starts from the assumption that firms will
seek alternative ways to protect their market share or profits when faced
with increased foreign competition resulting from trade liberalisation.
Firms’ ‘actions aimed at effectively locking competing imports or foreign
investors out of their domestic market’ (Trebilcock and Howse 2005: 591)
can include the ‘use of antitrust to subvert competition’ (Baumol and
Ordover 1985: 247).20 This argument lacks an explicit theory of politics
or policymaking but implicitly usually assumes a pluralistic responsiveness of policymakers to political lobbying (e.g. Shughart, Silverman and
Tollison 1995). Consequently, it yields similar observable implications to
those noted for the aggregate national welfare variant but for all countries
(rather than primarily for economically large countries) because there is
no assumption that policymakers seek to maximise aggregate welfare and
therefore may readily engage in selective enforcement that is ‘inefficient’
for the national economy.
Both variants of the competition-policy-as-protectionism perspective
remain empirically largely untested.21 We have discussed them together
because they have similar implications for the kind of competition
20

21

This starting point is consistent with Bhagwati’s (1988) ‘law of constant protection’,
according to which firms will always find a way to replace a barrier to trade that has been
negotiated away with a new one.
Limited anecdotal evidence exists, suggesting that both US and European competition
regulators have in some cases enforced competition laws in ways that discriminated against
foreign stakeholders (e.g. Guzman 1998: esp. 1532f.), and China’s 2007 antimonopoly law
has, almost from the beginning, prompted vocal concerns about selective and discriminatory enforcement (Huang 2008, but cf. Faure and Zhang 2013). Shughart, Silverman and
Tollison (1995) present a statistical analysis of antitrust enforcement budgets for the US
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, in which the US enforcement
agencies’ resources are significantly correlated with the US trade deficit, suggesting more
vigorous antitrust enforcement at times when the United States in the aggregate was a
net importer. Ecological inference and other methodological problems, however, raise
questions about these findings, which we have also been unable to replicate with their
aggregate data.
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provisions we should expect to find in PTAs. This yields our first hypothesis, which we will further operationalise in the next section:22
H1 : To the extent that trade agreements contain competition provisions, they
should reflect concern about selective enforcement and contain measures to
prevent or discipline such enforcement against firms from the other Parties.

II. Free trade and competition policy as complements
Dissatisfied with the theoretical approach sketched previously, we have
developed an alternative theoretical account, which views trade openness and competition policy as genuine complements. We start from the
observation that the progressively denser web of PTAs and the shift from
the GATT to the more legalised WTO have institutionalised trade liberalisation in such a way that governments’ ability to protect domestic
producers through traditional trade barriers has been severely compromised (Bagwell and Staiger 1999). Domestic producers – now exposed
to increased foreign competition – might, of course, still turn to their
governments to clamour for protection, and governments might yet find
new covert means of protecting domestic firms from foreign competitors
(e.g. Kono 2006). If the governments’ hands, however, truly are increasingly tied by trade agreements, firms have an incentive to pursue what has
become known as ‘private protection’ (Ludema 2001; Trebilcock 1996;
Williams and Rodriguez 1995): protecting themselves from the consequences of market competition through collusion with their ostensible
competitors or other anticompetitive practices. In fact, trade liberalisation creates opportunities and incentives for engaging in anticompetitive
practices transnationally for at least two reasons. First, the integration
of product markets creates opportunities for gain from collusion across
borders, which did not exist when the boundaries of states and markets
largely coincided. Second, integration creates additional incentives for
such anticompetitive behaviour by lowering the risk of getting caught.
International cartels, for instance, may be harder to detect or prosecute
because antitrust agencies may find it more difficult to monitor global
markets and pursue enforcement against them as most of the evidence
can be kept out of reach of any one enforcement agency (e.g. Connor
2007).
22

Elsewhere (e.g. Bradford 2007; Büthe 2014), we critique the deductive logic of these
arguments. Here, we simply focus on the empirical implications.
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Assessing this argument is made more difficult by the fact that such
private protection is illegal in many countries. Consequently, changing
patterns of anticompetitive behaviour are virtually impossible for scholars
to observe directly. The argument, however, also has observable implications for what governments should write into PTAs, provided that we are
able to assume that governments generally:
1. understand the international political economy of market competition
and anticompetitive behaviour in open economies at least sufficiently
well to recognise that trade openness creates opportunities and incentives for private protection and
2. in fact, seek to safeguard market competition against the accumulation
and abuse of market power (at least in countries with an independent
enforcement agency).23
Under these assumptions, governments should see trade openness and
the need for vigorous competition policy as complements.24 Governments can attempt to increase enforcement unilaterally, for example,
through intensified monitoring. Alternatively, or in addition, they should
be expected to counteract transnational collusion through corresponding transgovernmental collaboration. Such regulatory cooperation may
and does take place informally, but we would also expect to find evidence of a trade-related increase in substantively meaningful antitrust
provisions in trade agreements or in separate antitrust enforcement
agreements.
In sum, this alternative theoretical perspective implies for PTAs:
H2 : If trade agreements contain competition provisions, they will focus on
enhancing the capacity and procedures for detecting transnational anticompetitive behaviour and strengthening transgovernmental enforcement cooperation.
23

24

The argument does not depend on any particular assumption about the goals of competition policy. We merely allow for the possibility that competition regulators mean
it when they claim that safeguarding market competition is their primary goal. The
effectiveness of such normative commitment is at least a real possibility since antitrust
regulators form a tight transnational peer network, which provides mechanisms for reenforcing shared professional norms through the reputational and social dynamics identified by Sabel and Zeitlin’s (2010) notion of ‘experimentalist’ governance (see also Ansell
2011).
Strictly speaking, the logic of our argument requires governments or national regulators
only to observe (rather than anticipate) increased anticompetitive activity and attribute it
to trade openness.
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F. Empirical analysis, part 2: PTA competition
provisions, 1945–2010
In this overview of the specific content of PTAs, we focus on those competition provisions that allow us to distinguish between the two theoretical
approaches discussed in Section E. Some common competition policy
provisions, however, are worth noting even though they do not allow us
to assess the relative explanatory power of the two theoretical approaches.
Specifically, of the 137 PTAs that contain any substantive competition provisions, 40 PTAs (29.2 per cent) contain an obligation to have or adopt
a competition law – or other obligations that are predicated upon having or maintaining a competition law.25 A considerably smaller number,
24 PTAs (17.5 per cent), contain an obligation for ‘transparency’ in the
implementation of the national competition law’s enforcement policies
and practices.26
Very common, by contrast, are provisions that commit the signatories
to establishing a working group, study group or committee of representatives of parties’ governments (or competition authorities) to discuss
competition policy issues. PTAs may include such a commitment in one
of two ways:
1. The PTA may establish such a committee or working group for the
PTA as a whole and include competition policy within its purview,
usually in this case along with most or all other subjects covered in the
PTA.
2. The PTA may establish a separate working group specifically for competition policy discussion.
Figure 10.3 shows the distribution of these options (vis-à-vis each other
and vis-à-vis having no such provision in the PTA at all), illustrating the
overwhelming prevalence of the first option. The near-universal inclusion
of provisions for the institutionalisation of inter- or transgovernmental
dialogue is certainly interesting. However, since such a working group
may be used not only to coordinate policies or cooperate in enforcement (consistent with H2 ) but also to address accusations of selective,
25

26

For PTAs in which one party did not previously have a competition law (a piece of
information that we are still gathering), such a provision might be considered evidence
against H1 , since a government that is concerned about selective enforcement should
hardly want to commit other governments to having such laws.
Here, we specifically coded for whether the word transparency appeared in the PTA
provision given its prominence in the literature.
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4.4% 5.1%

90.5%

No working group for competition issues
General PTA working group
Competition policy–specific working group

Figure 10.3 PTA-established working groups for the discussion of competition
policy

discriminatory enforcement (consistent with H1 ), the presence or absence
of these provisions does not allow us to distinguish between the two theoretical positions.

I. Testing H1
If governments include competition policy provisions in PTAs primarily
out of a concern that other governments may enforce their competition laws selectively and for protectionist purposes, we would expect to
find – frequently and prominently – provisions that seek to safeguard
against such discrimination. The risk of selective enforcement might be
reduced, for instance, through mutual commitments that competition
regulators and courts must provide full legal reasoning to those against
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Figure 10.4 Provisions indicating concerns about selective enforcement

whom they bring competition policy enforcement actions. H1 would also
lead us to expect committing the parties to provide various procedural
rights in competition law enforcement cases or to guarantee the right to
judicial review or appeal following initial (often administrative) decisions
in competition enforcement cases or merger review.27 We therefore asked
coders to record for each PTA whether it included such provisions. As
shown by the first three bars in Figure 10.4, they are quite rare. An obligation to provide legal reasoning is found in only one of the 137 PTAs with
substantive competition provisions. The other commitments are found
in 18 and 11 PTAs, respectively.
27

The coding question and response options were:
Does the PTA establish any of the following obligations for the governments of the
member countries in the implementation of their antitrust/competition law? Please
check all that apply.
to provide the legal reasoning behind any decisions;
to provide for procedural rights for the defendant in antitrust proceedings, such
as opportunities to present evidence, to be heard, to cross-examine witnesses;
 to provide for judicial review (appeal) of an antitrust enforcement or merger review
decision.
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An even stronger safeguard against selective enforcement with protectionist intent might be created by a requirement to notify the other party
before an enforcement action is taken against one of its firms or citizens.28
Finally, a ‘negative comity’ provision would have the same thrust – and
arguably provides the strongest safeguard. Negative comity, as Dabbah
(2011: 288) puts it well, seeks to ‘prevent jurisdictional conflict’. Such
a provision in a PTA would entail each party committing to take the
actions and important interests of the other parties into consideration
before taking any actions that may affect the interests of those other parties. As shown by the last two bars in Figure 10.4, a commitment to alert
the other party before taking enforcement actions against one of its firms
or citizens is relatively common, found in 22.6 per cent of the 137 PTAs.
By contrast, and very surprisingly, negative comity provisions – which we
would have expected to be quite common – are very rare in our sample,
found in just over 5 per cent of the PTAs.

II. Testing H2
What would we expect instead if hypothesis 2 were borne out? If the inclusion of competition policy provision in PTAs were largely or predominantly motivated by a desire to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
competition law enforcement in the face of increasingly internationally
integrated markets, we would expect a very different emphasis in the specific provision. In our theoretical discussion in Section E.II, we focused on
transgovernmental cooperation among competition regulators to facilitate the detection of increasingly transnational anticompetitive practices
and possible cooperation in enforcement. But such transgovernmental
cooperation presupposes not just the existence but also substantial capacity on the part of the competition regulator. We would therefore expect,
first, provisions that ensure or increase regulatory capacity at the national
level through commitments to
r devote resources to enforcement,
r establish and maintain an independent enforcement agency and
r provide reciprocal or (in North–South PTAs) unilateral technical

capacity-building assistance.29
28
29

We note as a caveat that such an obligation impinges on the other country’s sovereignty
and might therefore be resisted.
The exact question and response option wording here was: ‘Does the PTA establish
an obligation to cooperate on antitrust or competition matters in any of the following
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Figure 10.5 Provisions indicating desire to enhance enforcement

As shown by the first three bars in Figure 10.5, provisions that commit the parties to devote ancillary resources to enforcement are quite
rare, found in only 2 of the 137 PTAs (possibly because such provisions
impinge upon the sovereignty over budgetary matters of the parties’ legislatures), but the other types of provisions are more common, found in 20
(14.6 per cent) and 14 (10.2 per cent) of the PTAs, respectively.
Given the existence, or at least the promise, of capable enforcement
agencies, we would then expect an emphasis on information exchange,
possibly policy coordination (subject to a caveat similar to the caveat
that applied to the funding commitment earlier) and, especially, ‘positive comity’ provisions, under which each party, acting at that moment
as the so-called requesting party, ‘can ask the other party (known as
the requested party) to address anticompetitive behavior within the
latter’s boundaries [based solely on the claim that the behavior] has a
[detrimental] effect on the interest of the former’ (Dabbah 2011:
ways? . . . For one or more of the Parties to provide technical assistance or resource transfer
to another Party to help it finance its enforcement activity or build its competitionregulatory capacity.’
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288). Such a positive comity provision constitutes the clearest and
most far-reaching commitment to assist each other in competition law
enforcement.
As shown by the last three columns in Figure 10.5, information
exchange provisions (about both enforcement actions and merger
reviews) are quite common, found in 26.5 per cent of PTAs. Commitments to policy coordination are less common, found in 8.8 per cent of
PTAs (though they are still more common than what should have been
the theoretically strongest type of provisions for H1 ). Most strikingly,
positive comity – considered a very demanding commitment from a legal
point of view – is more common than any other commitments, as it is
found in almost half (48.5 per cent) of the PTAs.

G. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined competition policy provisions in PTAs.
Such provisions are a puzzle from a traditional trade economics perspective and have only recently begun to attract systematic scholarly attention.
We have sought to provide an initial sketch of some of the key variation
in competition policy provisions in PTAs – including the form such provisions take and how their role has changed over time – based on a large
random sample of 182 PTAs drawn from the DESTA Database. We have
also briefly explored the extent to which the increased formalisation of
the treatment of competition issues in PTAs might be merely a reflection
of a general trend towards deeper PTAs and found this to be only modestly so and with several caveats. Most importantly, we introduced two
alternative and quite general theoretical approaches for thinking about
the relationship between trade openness and competition policy, from
which we have derived two rather different hypotheses about the kinds of
competition policy provision we should expect to find in PTAs. Our final
(though still explicitly preliminary) empirical analysis has yielded some
support for both, although on balance we observe with greater frequency
provisions that suggest a deep concern with and interest in enhanced
enforcement cooperation rather than concern about the protectionist
selective enforcement by the other side in the PTA.30
30

Numerous further provisions are yet to be examined in future work when the content
analysis is fully completed. Dispute settlement mechanisms of the PTAs, for example,
should be very telling, since subjecting competition policy to a DSM should be very
important if governments are concerned about selective, discriminatory enforcement.
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The research presented is drawn from work in progress, which itself is
part of a larger research agenda that also entails collecting and coding in
detail all national competition laws since the first such law for each country. This will allow us to examine, for instance, whether PTAs create new
obligations or simply codify what countries are already doing. As part of
that larger project, we are also collecting and coding bilateral competition
enforcement agreements (a potential substitute for competition provisions in PTAs, which could be a source of omitted variable bias for the
analysis of PTAs). And we are collecting enforcement data to allow us to
test whether countries only commit to competition provisions in PTAs if
they are undertaking serious enforcement already.
Beyond this work in progress, the research presented here suggests
several promising avenues for future research. In particular, we know
little about the details of the treaty-writing process. Who actually writes
PTAs? Who exerts influence over what competition provisions get written into a PTA – and who is unsuccessful when they attempt to
influence such content of PTAs? We should also want to know more
about the consequences of these provisions, including whether they are
enforced in practice, and what their effects are on actual competition
law and enforcement, as well as on the behaviour of private economic
actors.
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